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Cordon and clear
The News on Sunday asks leading political analysts and former army
generals about the strategic importance and timing of the ongoing
Operation Rah-i-Raast, the tactics being employed by the security
forces, a possible exit strategy, the role of a civilian Here is what they have to say… The operation is a delayed action -- Ahmed Rashid Writer and political analyst This time army seems determined. This is obviously because of the will of the government and the army. And of course, there was external pressure too. The questions arising in the minds of the people, and of course mine, are: will the government and the army be able to eliminate the Taliban this time? How long will this continue? What will be the fate of IDPs? etc. People also want to know as to what the strategy of the government is to protect and rehabilitate the hugely displaced population. We also want to know the exit strategy of the government. The government must come up with clear plans taking people into confidence regarding its operational and exit strategy. I believe this operation is delayed action. This action should have been taken months ago. And this is also true that now the perception of public is changing. The majority of people is now sick of the Taliban, and want peace and to get rid of the militants. The suspicions, doubts and confusion about the links between the army and the Taliban were there. Now the fog is clearing. This is also to be seen whether this operation continues or is derailed by something like Mumbai attacks, incidents in Punjab or some other attacks. These things can derail the operation. I strongly feel that the issue of IDPs needs to be tackled carefully. The present efforts, however, seem insufficient.
Political analyst Ideally, the ongoing Operation Rah-i-Raast should be viewed as counter-insurgency but at the moment the tactics seem more attuned to low-intensity conflicts. This is a function partly of capacity constraints and partly of lack of COIN training for the Pakistan Military. Heavy artillery and air power should be kept in the barracks in such asymmetric operations. Yet, lack of quick transport and special forces preparedness in sufficient numbers is forcing the state to use a risky strategy where collateral damage becomes more likely. Within the constraints, however, they are doing the best they can from what I can determine. Also, remember, the real test is yet to come. The militants shall be flushed out -- that was not an issue even in the first two phases of Rah-i-Raast -- but the tougher part is holding and normalising the area. That is where the Pakistan Army had shied away but cannot afford to do so this time round. The areas will have to be held on to by troops (Frontier Constabulary (FC) preferably) for some months as political normalisation begins and the civil service returns to normality.
The timing of the operation was perfect. This is besides the point
that the military should never have stopped the last operation when
it did; rather it should have gone on to eliminate the Taliban no
matter what. At the heart, this is an ideological battle, one where
the state must have popular support for its actions. Any military
operation before the recent sea change in Pakistani sentiment would
have been counter-productive. Tactically it makes it tougher now but
that's the wrong way to think
I think there should be no 'exit' in the short term. The FC has to be installed in the region to ensure that the militants do not return as they did on previous occasions. Apart from that, the active cessation of the operation will depend on how well it progresses. Once that is over, then the government, not army, has to determine how to deal with locals, miscreants who surrender, and the broader governance issues. In domestic COINs, you never see exit strategies such as in Iraq or Afghanistan since local armies have the luxury of staying on for as long as they want. At this point, my sense is that speedy withdrawal will not be forced by locals if the operation goes well. Tactically, the militants will be run over (some eliminated, some will go underground). But that is only part of the story. The key is to see how the state deals with the affectees of the saga. How much collateral damage has taken place? How does one pacify the locals? How effectively will the ANP government deal with the locals and the certainty with which the army can say these militants will not be allowed to return? My sense is the future is more turbulent than we think. Peace will return, but only temporarily. I have been for a dialogue with the Taliban and was even for the Swat deal, but beyond that, if the state was not going to tackle them now, then when? The solution is to bring the 'good' Taliban on board -- Lt Gen (r) Hameed Gul Former Director General Inter Services Intelligence Unless Pakistani political leadership removes contradictions within it and stops taking dictation from external players, the issue of militancy cannot be resolved. This military operation, launched after the American pressure, also shows a clear failure of political leadership in Islamabad and NWFP. I am against the operation. It shows political defeat. Now that it has been launched, they should conclude it swiftly to create an amicable environment engaging the 'good' Taliban in dialogue with full sincerity. The federal and the provincial governments do not appear to be sincere in their efforts.
In Swat, there are three types of Taliban: One group consists of
criminals in the guise of the Taliban; the other is of those who
have crossed the Durand Line, and
The focus of this operation should be to eliminate miscreants and criminals, followed by a dialogue with the 'good' Taliban, asking them to separate themselves from the extremists. The rest of the Taliban should be forced to leave or face consequences. If the 'good' Taliban do not break any law and just want Islamic system then there is no harm in enforcing that system in Swat because it is an old, unheard demand. I don't understand why we are killing our own people. Look at the 1.5 million displaced people. This cannot continue for long. If this goes on the situation will further destabilise Pakistan. America wanted to engage Pakistan Army in this operation for a long time but has finally jumped into it itself. Calling the All Parties Conference (APC) was not a bad decision. The ultimate solution of this problem is political -- not war. America wants to drag Pakistan in this war. If Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani should identify the enemies when he publicly says that enemies have a bad eye on Pak nukes and the government will not let this happen. The ruling political leadership hesitates to name Israel, America and India, who are the enemies of Pakistan. Unless Pakistani leadership takes indigenous decisions this crisis will continue. The solution is to bring the 'good' Taliban on board, create peace and bring displaced people back to their homes after crushing the miscreants. Also, make this operation quick. Otherwise, it will be too late. If the military has an exit plan, it would not make sense to announce it -- Shuja Nawaz Political and strategic analyst The Swat operation is a military operation against an insurgency, using conventional forces that have been inoculated for battle against an irregular force through a three-part training programme that prepares them for such fighting. This approach was developed for FATA operations under then Director General Military Operations Major General Ahmed Shuja Pasha and continued since then. A full-blown counterinsurgency operation would involve civilian, political and economic aspects that need to be dovetailed and the development of civil affairs capabilities inside the army to work with teams from the civil administration and with local police forces. The latter would then hold and rebuild the areas once the military clears them. Otherwise, the risk is that the areas would revert back to the militants. This dovetailing does not appear to be the case in Swat or even FATA as yet. The often quoted lesson is that the military alone cannot win such wars: it is the civil and the police that help sustain victory after the military buys time and space for them to act. The timing of the action has to be decided by the civil authorities. In this case, they waited for the deal to fail so they could point to the inability of the Taliban to deliver their end of the bargain. The deal was foredoomed. And the cost of the subsequent military actions has been high for both the locals and the military, as a result of the long delay before acting against the militants. You cannot deal with militants from a position of weakness or perceived weakness. Aerial attacks run the risk of higher collateral damage. Cordon and clear are the most appropriate tactics. The army seems to be following that approach but given the long delay and the advance warnings to the militants, they have dug in. The battle may get too costly. If the military has an exit plan, it would not make sense to announce it, nor its timing. Ideally, the government needs to have a strategic plan for the region and FATA. It needs to be proactive in that regard and not react to developments as they occur nor rely on overseas aid to pull it out of this hole. A better coordinated plan with the provincial authorities and the military, involving the civil, police, and local populations need to be crafted and applied according to local conditions in Swat and in each Agency of FATA. It depends on the planning being done in Islamabad and with Peshawar. If only military action is being planned then we may see a repeat of earlier actions and the Taliban will re-appear. The army is not designed to hold the area indefinitely or to police it. It is not embedded inside the communities. For that we will need an enhanced police and rangers' presence in Swat. To say if the Army acted on its own implies that the army acted on its own. That does not seem to be the case. Further, Pakistan has to act in its own interest not because the United States or some other power pressures it to act The operation cannot linger on -- Lt General (r) Moin-ud-Din Haider Former Interior Minister The army operation seems to be the final option after local security forces failed to restore peace in Swat and after the law and order completely deteriorated and political efforts failed to bring peace by tackling the militancy through dialogues and deals. Nizam-e-Adl regulation deal was not given enough time and Sufi Muhammad and his group should have been given more time to ensure what they had promised with the government. The operation was the last choice to restore peace. The pressure from external forces like America and other parts of the world actually came after the Swat deal was enforced and the pressure increased after the situation started going worse. Sufi Muhammad and his supporters cannot be separated from the Taliban and militancy as they had been lodging armed movements in their areas taking law and order into their hands after 9/11. This army operation should not continue for long. In my view this operation should end in four to five weeks. The area should be cleared off the militants. And instead of rethinking the possibility of further dialogue and deals, there should be a strong civil administration in the area to bring peace and maintain law and order. Besides, the army cannot remain in this situation for long. The strategy can be changed and some force can be sustained in disguise but the operation will have to be concluded swiftly. People are also fed up of this situation and want peace in their area. And if the peace is not restored at the earliest displaced people will start protesting. Most importantly, the government must generously and honestly focus on the rehabilitation of the displaced people bringing them back from the shelters and camps. It should also develop the valley fully. The News : Sunday ,24 May ,2009 |
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