Kishanganga dam controversy
View from Pakistan
Ijaz Hussain
When Pakistan and
India signed the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in 1960, it was thought
that it would forever put to end water as an issue between them.
However, today it appears as if that promise was unfounded.
This is borne out by the number of
water-related disputes that keep cropping up between the two
countries every few years. First it was Sallal Dam, then Wullar
Barrage followed by Baglihar Dam.
Now it is the Kishanganga Dam that
has embroiled the two countries in a dispute. Their Indus Waters
Commissioners have recently concluded a second round of talks on the
issue and are to meet again next month in New Delhi for another
round. What is the nature of this controversy and what are the
prospects of a negotiated settlement?
The controversy owes its genesis to
India’s plan to build a 330-megawatt hydro-power plant in
Indian-administered Kashmir across the Jhelum River. The dam site is
located 160 km upstream from Muzaffarabad and involves the diversion
of Kishanganga River (called the Neelum River in Pakistan) to a
tributary named Bunar Madumati Nullah of Jhelum near Bunkot. The
diversion will change the course of the Neelum by about 100 km,
which will then join the Jhelum through Wullar lake near the town of
Bandipur in Baramulla district. As a result of this diversion, the
Neelum and Jhelum rivers, which at present join each other near
Muzaffarabad at Domail, will meet in Indian-administered Kashmir.
Pakistan regards the project as a
violation of the IWT. It raised a number of objections in 2004 as a
result of which India revised the design of the dam in order to meet
Pakistan’s objections. Pakistan, however, was still not satisfied
with the revised design and raised fresh objections. During the
current round of negotiations these objections, which relate to gate
structure, height and size, level, diversion plan, storage capacity,
power intact and free board were discussed. However, there was no
agreement on any one of them because the two sides refused to budge
from their stated positions. Discussions could not be completed on
the technical and legal aspects of the issue because of paucity of
time. Of all the objections that Pakistan has raised, diversion of
the Neelum is perhaps the core issue. Pakistan argues that India can
store water but cannot divert it because under the IWT, it is under
obligation to release as much water downstream as it stores. In its
opinion, the diversion would reduce the flow of water into Pakistan
by about 11 percent in summer and about 27 percent in winter, which
would be contrary to the IWT as the Western rivers that are in
question belong to Pakistan.
Similarly, Pakistan claims that the
project would reduce the power generation capacity of the
969-megawatt Neelum-Jhelum plant by about 11 percent. It also
contends that the diversion would result in an ecological disaster
for the area. It has no exact data at present but has commissioned
an international firm to prepare an environmental damage assessment
report. Pakistan also objects to the construction of the Kishanganga
project on the ground that it would affect power generation capacity
of the plant that it is building on the Neelum-Jhelum confluence.
Besides, it argues that the
feasibility study of the Neelum-Jhelum project that it has completed
entitles it to stop India from building a storage facility for
diverting water. In its view, the planned use of the river Jhelum by
it is as good as the term “use of water” in the IWT. India
categorically rejects Pakistan’s line of argument. To begin with, it
disputes the contention that the diversion would reduce the flow of
water into Pakistan. In its view, the quantum of water would remain
the same as before. The only difference that the diversion, in its
opinion, would make would be that instead of meeting in
Pakistan-administered Kashmir as is the case at present, the Neelum
and Jhelum rivers would meet in the Indian-administered Kashmir.
India also rejects Pakistan’s contention that the completion of the
feasibility study of the Neelum-Jhelum project has created an
acquired right in favour of Pakistan. On the contrary, it asserts
that commencement of work on the Kishanganga project gives an edge
to India’s claim.
Examining the claims of the two
countries regarding the superiority of their right on the ground of
“existing use”, we note that it is the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of
the Waters of International Rivers which cover the matter. Article
8(2a) defines “existing use” as “a use that is in fact
operational...from the time of the initiation of construction
directly related to the use.” Given the fact that we do not dispose
of the requisite information on the Kishanganga and Neelum-Jhelum
projects based on the definition of the “existing use”, it is not
possible to pronounce in the matter. One thing is, however, clear.
If Pakistan is to successfully
challenge India on the issue it would have to show that the
diversion of the Neelum would significantly reduce the flow of water
into its territory and cause appreciable damage to the environment
of the area. This brings us to the question of the possibility of a
negotiated settlement. India always advocates the bilateral approach
as the best and the only way for conflict resolution of IWT-related
issues. It claims that bilateralism rather than third party
arbitration has emerged as the norm between the two countries.
Pakistan disagrees with the Indian contention and insists on the
continuing validity of the IWT. However, it is ready to give the
bilateral approach a try on the condition that India spell out a
timeframe for a negotiated settlement. This is what it did during
the negotiations on the Baglihar issue and also during the recently
concluded round of talks. However, going by newspaper reports,
India’s response to the matter is unclear, though the latter has
apparently agreed to resolve the issue during the next round of
negotiations.
This is the lesson from the Baglihar
negotiations where India used all kinds of tactics to present
Pakistan with a fait accompli. For example, it did not let a
Pakistani team make an on-site inspection of the dam for quite some
time on the ground of security. Then on two occasions, when Pakistan
was ready to seize the World Bank for arbitration, it made requests
for more efforts at bilateral settlement while all along it was
proceeding with mala fide intentions by continuing the work on the
dam. Finally, even after the appointment of a neutral expert, the
Indian PM termed it as “premature’ and the Indian Water Resources
Minister asked the World Bank to leave the two parties alone to
settle the matter bilaterally.India seems to be employing the same
tactics of procrastination in the present case. For example, when,
during the recently concluded session, Jamaat Ali Shah, Pakistan’s
Indus Waters Commissioner, asked that his six objections be treated
as questions, which is a condition sine qua non for invoking article
9 of the IWT relating to third party arbitration, his Indian
counterpart reportedly requested him to desist from it and let them
remain as objections. This is just the start of the merry-go-round
of dilatory tactics by India. We will certainly see more of them in
the months and years to come. Will the Pakistani side be able to
checkmate them this time? Only time will tell.
[The writer
is a former dean of social sciences at Pakistan’s Quaid-i-Azam
University. He can be reached at hussain_ijaz@hotmail.com]
etalaat.com 19 June, 2009
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